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ABSTRACT
The ongoing popularity of health and fitness applications catalyzes
the need for exploring forensic artifacts produced by them. Sensitive
Personal Identifiable Information (PII) is requested by the appli-
cations during account creation. Augmenting that with ongoing
user activities, such as the user’s walking paths, could potentially
create exculpatory or inculpatory digital evidence. We conducted
extensive manual analysis and explored forensic artifacts produced
by (n = 13) popular Android mobile health and fitness applications.
We also developed and implemented a tool that aided in the timely
acquisition and identification of artifacts from the examined ap-
plications. Additionally, our work explored the type of data that
may be collected from health and fitness web platforms, and Web
Scraping mechanisms for data aggregation. The results clearly show
that numerous artifacts may be recoverable, and that the tested
web platforms pose serious privacy threats.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile/smart devices are being used as powerful self-health mon-
itoring tools. This movement is considered to have more impact
on health care than immobile health facilities [31]. Due to the ad-
vancement of mobile health, there are now ample applications and
wearable technologies that address not just our health and fitness
concerns, but treatments as well. The number of mobile health
applications has increased enormously for both consumers and
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professionals. As of 2017, more than 325,000 ‘mhealth’ applications
were available, Android being the leading platform1. The mobile
health industry is expected to hold a market share of almost $37
billion by 2019 and $60 billion by 20202.
However, the widespread use of mobile fitness/health technolo-
gies is just another catalyst for user data aggregation [5]. The large
amount of sensitive personally identifiable data stored by mobile
health and fitness applications poses an extensive threat to our
privacy. Yet, for digital sleuths, these user-data-rich applications
are a treasure chest of digital evidence. In fact, evidence retrieved
from such applications has already helped in solving real cases3.
Our work focused on the collection and analysis of forensic
artifacts retrieved from widely used mobile health and fitness ap-
plications. The aim was to outline a template for digital forensic
investigators to follow when examining an Android device with
installed health and fitness application(s). In total, (n = 13) Android
health and fitness applications were analyzed. A single application
had 50 million downloads at the time of this writing, illustrating
the ubiquity of such software. To date, there has not been a com-
prehensive forensic analysis of these applications, and thus our
contributions are as follows:
• Our work has produced a comprehensive collection of An-
droid health and fitness application digital forensic artifacts,
which are shared on the Artifact Genome Project [18].
• Our work provides a novel method for triaging data poten-
tially stored on a mobile device.
• Our devised method is also implemented in a tool that aids in
that automation of the acquisition and analysis of evidence
retrieved from health and fitness applications on Android. 4
• As an auxiliary contribution, our work provides insight into
privacy findings related to the amount of user data made
public by some of the health and fitness applications.
The rest of this paper includes related work in Section 2. Section 3
shares the employed methodology. We then discuss the experimen-
tal results and findings in Section 4, followed by the discussion






4The tool may be downloaded from https://www.unhcfreg.com/datasetsandtools.
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2 RELATED WORK
Mobile forensics and application analysis are not new topics. As
early as the first generation of smartphones, Bader et al., [9] con-
ducted the first forensic analysis on the iPhone 3Gs. That early
work aimed at finding significant evidence such as e-mail mes-
sages, text and multimedia from the logical backup of the phone.
In 2011, research investigating 3rd party mobile applications on
the iPhone was conducted [28]. The research focused on analyzing
built-in application data stored in files with standardized formats
like databases, JSON and XML.
Android and iOS now occupy the majority of the mobile market
and this is reflected in mobile forensics research. While data privacy
has become paramount, digital forensic researchers continue to seek
solutions for extracting digital evidence from the changing mobile
landscape.
In Section 2.1, we share work that improved data acquisition and
application analysis on smart phones. In Section 2.2, we discuss
case studies that focused on sharing forensic solutions for mobile
devices or applications.
2.1 Data Acquisition Approaches
Starting from the first generation of mobile devices, data acquisition
has been continuously studied. A typical manner for acquiring
logical data from an Android device is to utilize the Android Debug
Bridge (ADB) client since Android has a built-in ADB server [23,
27]. Although this approach is still wildly in use, it requires the
investigator to gain physical device access by unlocking the screen
to activate the ADB server. Therefore, an acquisition method based
on changing the custom recovery image has also been studied [39].
Based on this approach commercial tools such as Cellebrite5 and
XRY6 are able to pull physical forensic images of devices as well.
Other research has focused on using hardware acquisition ap-
proaches. For example, Universal Synchronous Receiver-Transmitter
(UART), a fancy name for a serial port, and Joint Test Action
Group (JTAG), a reserved parallel port for system debugging, are
the most commonly used physical ports for examiners to acquire
firmware/file systems physically from FLASH memory chips on
the a smartphone’s Printed Circuit Board (PCB) [12, 15]. These
approaches have also been applied to other devices.
Work conducted by [29] utilized UART to pull a vehicle’s data
from its automotive system. Similarly, work by [36] performed data
acquisition on Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation systems
through UART. Other than accessing the PCB physically, the last
resort for physical acquisition is Chip-off. In Chip-off, investigators
disassemble the flash memory chip from the PCB and read the data
by using dedicated chip readers [16].
2.2 Application Analysis
Mobile application analysis is an evolving topic. Work has primarily
focused on executable analysis and user data analysis.
In [14], researchers presented a decompiler that converts exe-
cutable files back to source code. This enabled digital investigators
to reverse engineer applications as well as understand operational
5https://www.cellebrite.com/en/home/
6https://www.msab.com/products/
mechanisms of the application(s). For large scale application analy-
sis, [41] focused on in-memory analysis of large application datasets.
AndroParse, an extendable feature dataset of 67,703 benign and
46,683 malicious Android applications [33] has also been created
by researchers.
In the application analysis domain, work has focused on the
manual analysis of social applications for Android/iOS [6, 30, 37].
Other work has focused on single widely used mobile applications,
such as WhatsApp [7, 26], and WeChat [38, 42]. Researchers have
also analyzed cryptowallets [21], and application valuts [40].
Other relevant work by [20] studied medical information from
both Android and iOS applications associated with a physical medi-
cal device. Related work has also focused on wearable devices such
as fitness trackers [25] and smart watches [10, 13].
Lastly, it is important to note that there is some previous work
in the area of health/fitness application analysis. [8] examined 40
popular Android health applications in 2015. In their work, user
credentials, location and more personal information was discovered.
Since 2015, some of the applications examined by [8] are no longer
in use or have been significantly updated (e.g. MyFitnessPal was
examined in version 3.6.1 and its current version is 18.9.2). Most
importantly, this past work did not introduce an automation tool
to aid in the future forensic analysis of such health data found on
mobile platforms. This work is discussed more in Section 5.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this study, (n = 13) mobile health and fitness applications (See
Table 2) were selected by searching the Google Play Store with the
following search terms “fitness" and “health." From these prelim-
inary results, we took into account the number of downloads for
each result.
In the first phase, we set up the experimental environment which
included downloading the health applications on to a hypothetical
suspect’s Android device, generating user data through regular daily
usage, installing digital forensic tools on our examiner workstation
and setting up the network (more details can be found in Sec. 3.1).
In the second phase, we utilized the tools installed for acquiring
data from the hypothetical suspect’s phone (See Sec. 3.2). To ana-
lyze the data generated by the health and fitness applications, we
explored the data manually and theorized a new approach that can
be potentially used for application analysis (See Section 3.3). This
approach will assist digital investigators in triaging the structure
of the mobile data and validating their findings afterwards.
Finally, we constructed the theorized approach as a python tool
to automate the process of data analysis and artifact collection
(See Sec. 3.4), and concluded with the use of a web scraper on two
different websites (Strava and MyFitnessPal).
3.1 Apparatus
Table 1 shows the hardware and software used in this work. Con-
sidering that results may vary on different Android devices, we
used two Android devices (a Nexus tablet and a ZTE phone) with
different Android OS versions for our testing.
A Windows 10 and a Mac OSX computers were employed as
forensic workstations. On theWindows machine we installed foren-
sic tools for data acquisition and network traffic analysis. The Mac
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Table 1: Apparatus
Hardware/software Version Use





To analyze data and run python
script
XRY 7.4.0 To acquire the data from Android
devices
DB Browser for SQLite 3.10.1 To analyze db files
ADB 1.0.40 To pull data from Android device
Wireshark 2.4.1 To capture and analyze network
traffic
Netwitness Investigator 10.6 To analyze network traffic
Network Miner 2.3.2 To analyze network traffic
Nexus 7 Tablet Android 6.0.1 To test applications on
ZTE (Model Z557BL) Android 7.1.1 To test applications on
Web Scraper (Google Ex-
tension)
0.3.8 To extract data from Strava and
MapMyFitness accounts
computer was used for application data analysis. We tested our
proposed tool on the acquired data.
AWiFi hotspot was created on the Windows workstation, which
the Nexus device connected to. Wireshark was used to capture
the network traffic when the applications were used. The network
traffic for each application was saved in individual pcap files, which




























Figure 1: Sitemap for Web Scraper
3.2 Data Acquisition
After the application accounts were created and the fitness activities
were collected, we completed the data acquisition process using
two approaches. We utilized XRY toolkit for physical acquisition
and the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) for logical acquisition. XRY
backed up everything on the device and saved the extracted data to
the workstation. The command adb pull then acquired the logical
files and folders from the smart phones. Afterwards, the data was
thoroughly examined and findings were iteratively recorded.
Figure 2: Sitemap Graph
3.3 Data Analysis
Before performing manual analysis, there is an opportunity for
investigators to utilize Open Source InTelligence (OSINT) to gain
insight into what could be potentially retrieved from a mobile ap-
plication, or to simply profile a suspect. Applications may also have
a web interface, and suspects may attempt misinformation tactics
by engaging with a web platform after a device has been legally
seized. Therefore, as a primary step to our manual acquisition and
analysis, we explored the web application for Strava as a proof of
concept.
First, we logged into the Strava web platform with the user
account created in Phase 1 and employed a Google extension called
Web Scraper to scrape user data. The scrapped data was stored
in a Sitemap (a layered Json file). The structure of the data can
be visualized in a Sitemap layered graph. Creating a new Sitemap
required a structured listing of pages, links and texts to be scraped
from the site. Once a Sitemap is created, it can be imported when
needed. For example, Figure 1 shows a sample sitemap and Figure 2
is its corresponding graph. Wemapped the Strava site, and executed
the scraper for 10 minutes to explore the kind of public data that
may be downloaded about the users.
3.4 Tool Creation
The purpose for constructing this tool was to expedite the time
for acquiring and locating forensically relevant data. Investigators
face an increased need for timely evidence collection and examina-
tion. We implemented a Python tool that (1) extracts data from the
Android device, and (2) searches through the extracted files while
locating forensic artifacts. The high-level algorithm employed is
shown in Algorithm 1.
The constructed tool allows for any Android device to be con-
nected to a computer and, using the Android Debug Bridge (adb),
a command line tool that allows communication with Android
devices, fosters the data extraction process. The data is searched
through according to file type. Here, the three files types focused
on were image, XML, and SQLite database files.
When dealing with image files, images are copied and stored
into a directory. An output file is also created to store information
on the files found. For image files, the image name and the path to
the location of the image is written to the output file.
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Algorithm 1 Automation algorithm
Requirements: Connected Android device and ADB installed.
Input: (optional) inputFile with keywords






dataPath← getExtractedDataPath() ▷ Path to device’s data
hashDict← computeHash(dataPath) ▷ For verification
hashDict← saveHash(hashDict)
fileList← getAllFiles(dataPath)
fileTypes← [’XML’, ’DB’, ’IMAGE’]
sortedList← sortFilesByType(fileList, fileTypes)
for file in sortedList do
if fileType is XML then
if hasKeywords(file) then
outputFile.append(getName(file), keyword, linenumber)








checkHash(val) ▷ Check if hash of the file is unchanged
end
With XML and database files, each file is opened and user-defined
keywords are searched for. Keywords were generated using known-
artifacts. If a match to one of the keywords in an XML file is found,
then the path of the file, the keyword that was found, the line num-
ber where the keyword was found, and the line that the keyword
was found on is printed to the output file. If it is a database file,
then the file path, keyword found, and the row that the keyword
was found in is printed to the output file.
As the admissibility of any type of evidence is important, a copy
of the extracted data is made (Copy 2) and hashes are generated for
future comparison. The original extraction (Copy 1) is stored to be
verified against at any given point in time to show that data has
not been tampered with. Any data that is found to be important is
copied to an output file outside of the data itself while not altering
the original file. Once the search process is complete, the tool will
then re-hash the files and compare them against the original. This
is done to prove that data has remained untouched after the search
process ends its execution.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Extensive application artifacts were found on the devices. All arti-
facts can be downloaded from the Artifact Genome Project (AGP)
at https://agp.newhaven.edu [19]. Some of the more intriguing data
is outlined in the following sections. Section 4.1 elaborates on the
personal data that was supplied to the applications by the user.
Section 4.2 shows the different types of user health data that was
found stored on the device. Section 4.3 presents the applications that
stored location data from activities completed by the user, followed
by Section 4.4 which covers password information found stored on
the device and then Section 4.5, which covers interesting findings.
Lastly, Section 4.6 summarizes information found when employing
the web scraper on the Strava platform. A comprehensive report of
the artifacts is shared in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17 in the Appendix.
4.1 Personal Data
The type of user data requested by tested applications is shown in
Table 2. Much of this requested personal data can be found stored
in database and XML files. Health and fitness applications tend to
request data such as name, e-mail, age, gender, birthday, zip code,
height, weight, and blood pressure. All of this data is especially
sensitive and can be extremely helpful with identifying the user.
This data helps to not only identify the user by name, but also their
physical characteristics. An example of this is shown in Figure 3,
which illustrates the extraction of gender, height, weight, age, and
city from MapMyFitness. Note that the MapMyRun, MapMyFit-
ness, MapMyRide, MapMyWalk and MapMyHike all use a unified
account.
Figure 3: MapMyFitness User Information in Database
4.2 User Health Data
The Fitness Tracker application calls for an excessive amount of
personal information from the user to completely fill out the profile.
Of interest is the request for the following data: ethnicity, blood type,
pregnant (yes or no), lactating (yes or no), waist measurement, hip
measurement, neck measurement, and metabolism specifications.
All of this data was found stored in a log file on the phone in the
application directory with the timestamp of when it was added.
Each of these different characteristics are attached to a separate
date, that way one is able to see when the data was changed and how
current it is. This is especially interesting because the application
allowed for an upgraded DNA doctor Connect feature. The feature
allows users to add their raw genetic data from their personalized
DNA information from sites such as 23andMe and AncestryDNA.
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Table 2: Requested Data at Account Creation
Data Requested Name Birthday Sex Height Weight Email Location
MapMyFitness (18.8.1) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
RunKeeper (9.2.1) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Strava (64.0.0) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
MyFitnessPal (18.9.2) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Runtastic (8.9.2) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Health Infinity (1.3.7) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Fitness Tracker (2.1.0) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Nike Training (5.16.0) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
JEFIT (10.11) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
There is also a feature called Medical Log which allowed for the
user to store health data from doctor visits.
4.3 Geographical Locations
The applications analyzed allowed the user to record their fitness
activities as they were being completed. The different types of activ-
ities that were available for selection depended on the application
being used. Some of those activities include run, walk, jog, swim,
bike ride, etc.
To be able to record such data, the applications requested the user
allow access to their GPS. When searching through the extracted
data, we were able to find SQLite database files that stored data
such as longitude, latitude, and elevation during the fitness activity.
The date and time stamps for each of these activities, start and
end time is also stored. An example can be seen in Figure 4. These
applications included Runtastic and MapMyFitness.
Figure 4: Location Database Example
4.4 Password Data
The MyFitnessPal application stored a couple different passwords
in clear text. For instance, the user is allowed to set a diary pass-
word, making the diary view able only by those with the password.
The password is stored in a database file in clear text as shown in
Figure 5. This is particularly interesting when one considers that
Virginia Tech University and Dashlane analysts carried out a study
and “after examining a database of over 28 million users and their
61 million passwords, they have uncovered an alarming figure: 52%
of the users studied have the same passwords (or very similar and
easily hackable ones) for different services” [1]. This shows that
this information can be helpful for investigators with not only this
application, but other digital accounts of the same user. MyFitness-
Pal also allows for the user to set a pin on the application itself
so no information is viewable until that pin is entered. This pin
is also stored in clear text in the same database file. JEFIT, on the
other hand, stores their username and the MD5 hash of the user’s
password in an XML file.
Figure 5: Diary Password Stored in Clear Text in Database
File
4.5 Other Data
With fitness and health applications there is a vast amount of stored
data that may not be considered at first. In some cases, this infor-
mation can be beneficial to investigators. Take shoe tracking for
example. Some applications, such as RunKeeper and Runtastic, give
users the option to include the specific shoes they wear, as well as
which activity they wear them on, as a way to track the amount of
distance traveled with the specific pair of shoes. Shoe prints may be
benifitial in an investigation, and knowing the type of shoe worn by
a suspect may indeed prove useful. This data is stored in a database
file as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: RunKeeper Shoe Information in Database
Another interesting feature allowed by some applications is the
ability to upload photos to correlate with a specific activity or
post. These are then stored on the device and in some cases, such
as in Figure 7, they are stored with a timestamp. This timestamp
correlates with when it was uploaded to the application.
The RunKeeper application also allows for users to select what
are called sub feels. These sub feels are selected by the user after an
activity is completed and are used as a way to track any issues they
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Figure 7: Runtastic Photo Folder
had during the activity. An example of this could be an injury or bad
weather. If any of these are selected by the user, they are stored in
a database file and reference the trip id as seen in Figure 8. The trip
id correlates with the specific activity that was recorded. A piece
of information unique to the Health Infinity application is that the
user could track their medicine. They can input the medicine name,
dosage, time to take, start date, length of time to take the medicine,
and comments.
Figure 8: RunKeeper Subfeels in Database
4.6 Auxiliary Finding
As a side finding, when we tried to utilize a Web Scraper to gather
data from Strava’s website, we found that through the Leaderboard
page, we were able to access other users’ profiles regardless of
whether the profile was set to public or private. For both public
and private profiles, we were able to extract significant amount of
information, such as name, achievements, and photos.
To show how much information we can gather from this web-
site, we analyzed the CSV file that contained our scraped data and
summarized it in Table 3. Table 3 shows the summary of number
of entries found for the mentioned fields. Some of the field values
were null for some users because some of their information was set
to private.
Additionally, most of the users sharedmaps that show routes that
they took on a certain day for a certain workout, and they were able
to attach photos of that workout as well, as shown in Figure 9. We
inspected the element and analyzed the network tab for traffic. We
found an XMLHttpRequest (XHR), which had coordinates for every
move of the user, as shown in Figure 10. With this information, we
were able to know a person’s approximate position at a certain time.
Moreover, the maps web page also provided a link to flybys. Flyby is
Figure 9: A profile on Strava
a specific tool which compares distance and time of different users
for the specific activity. This is another potential way of getting
a list of Strava users. Regardless, the amount of data that one can
retrieve about other users using a simple Web Parser is significant.
The data that was found from the Strava mobile application can be
seen in Table 13.










Table 3: Web Scraper Output for Strava
Figure 10: User Coordinates
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Under Armour 7, a footware company, owns six applications
to track fitness activities. These include MapMyRun, MapMyFit-
ness, MapMyRide, MapMyWalk, MyFitnessPal, and MapMyHike.
All of these applications sync together and allow for a unified ac-
count. When logging into MapMy applications, the number of miles
tracked by all users since the start of 2019 is provided. When we
logged in on April 12th, 2019 the amount of miles was 178,756,688.
When looking at the MapMyFitness website it was discovered
that a user, once logged in, is able to search for routes that were
created near the location they selected. We experimented with the
aforementioned finding by using the Web Scraper to collect data
about the routes created near the University of New Haven. Table
4 shows a summary of the assembled data. Moreover, users are
able to search all the activities or narrow them down based on
run, bike ride, walk, etc. Then, once a specific route is selected
from the list, they are able to see who created it, and can go to
that user’s profile. If the person has a profile with public postings,
anyone with an account can view their posts. While looking at this,
we were able to observe that some users had consistent patterns
with their workouts and that some users took the same path at the
same time every day. Additionally, it was observed that some users
were shown to be starting and ending their workout at their house.
For some users we were able to find their social media accounts
based on their names and locations of their fitness account. On their
public account, one also has access to their friends. An example of
workouts posted by a public user account can be seen in Figure 11.
The artifacts that were found on the MapMy applications can be
seen in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 17.





Distance covered in miles 22
Map Sources 11
Table 4: Web Scraper Output for MapMyFitness
Figure 11: MapMyFitness User Profile
7https://www.underarmour.com/en-us/ua-record
5 DISCUSSION
Similar research was conducted in 2015 where 40 mobile health
applications were analyzed and three were discussed in detail. Our
work provided more granular results, and examined OSINT meth-
ods using web platforms as well. Prior work was tested using An-
droid 5.0.1 compared to our use of Android 6.0.1 and 7.1.1. Two of
the applications they discussed in detail, MyFitnessPal and Runk-
eeper, were also analyzed here. In terms of the Runkeeper appli-
cation, older research used version 5.4 whereas our research used
version 9.2.1. They focused only on one database file in detail, that
being RunKeeper.sqlite. The findings for this file line up with what
is stored in the most current version that we examined. We also
present the artifacts for this file, as well as other database and XML
files as shown in Table 9. Similarly, the MyFitnessPal version used
in older work was version is 3.6.1 and the application is now up to
version 18.9.2 which was used in our work. The file they discuss
in detail for this application is MyFitnessPal.db. While much of
the same data is still recorded in this database file, as shown in
Table 14, one noticeable difference is that the hash of the user’s
password is no longer stored, however, as discussed in Section 4.4,
they still store the diary password and pin for the application in
clear text. While this paper’s focus was to provide a generalized
idea of mobile fitness applications and the categories of data that
they store on devices, our main focus was a detailed account of
artifacts found stored due to these applications, as well as a novel,
automated mechanism to collect them. We did also examine privacy
concerns related to users allowing their data to be public.
In section 4.3, the geographical data found stored on the devices
was explained. This type of information has proven helpful to inves-
tigators in the past, such as in the murder cases of Jessica Patel and
Maria Ladenburger [2, 17]. These cases were able to use the data
stored on smartphone health applications to track the activities
of a suspect, as well as their location. Now, with the increasing
amount of applications to track health and fitness activities and
locations are more likely to be used as evidence in cases. These
applications also allow for wearable devices to be connected. These
wearable devices, such as Fitbits, have become increasingly popular,
and the trend of using them for sources of digital evidence will
surely continue, such as in the murder case of Karen Navarra [22],
where the data from her Fitbit was used as evidence. Our work,
therefore, has practical utility.
The data stored pertaining to shoes is beneficial for investigators
when the feature is utilized by the user. As seen in Section 4.5, some
applications allow for their users to track the exact shoes that they
own and the activities they complete with those shoes. Systems
are able to track the brand and model, along with the amount of
distance the shoe has been worn for. If the user completes a fitness
activity, they are able to link their shoe with that activity so it would
help show that the device was at this location, at this time, and
according to the user input, these shoes were the ones being worn.
This is especially interesting when considering that shoe prints
have been helpful in the past in terms of building evidence against
a suspect. For instance in a 2013 case, a shoe print left at the scene
of a murder was used as evidence to convict a suspect [32]. More
recently, there was a case involving data from use of the Strava
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application that helped to place the suspect near the location of the
crime at the time of the incident [34].
This is not the first time that the data from Strava user’s had
public implications. Last year, the application released their heat
map that ultimately revealed military bases that were in war zones
[24]. There was also an article written that referenced how easy it
was for someone to stalk their boyfriend on Strava, and ultimately
other females he ran with. The author stating, “I could see where
she lived, where she drank beer and got coffee. I knew how many
calories she burned working out, and how often. I knew when and
where and with whom she spent time" [11].
Occurrences such as those led to the need for section 4.6, where
we discussed the utilization of a Web Scraper to show the amount
of data that can be collected by anyone with a user account strictly
from the data that other users leave public. To show how easily this
could lead to unfavorable implications, we used the information
found on the site from public profiles to find out more about the
users. To show the severity of allowing so much information to
be public, we started with finding a user based off the name and
current city they provided. With this information, we were able
to find some of their corresponding social media accounts such as
Facebook and Pinterest. To be able to verify in some cases that this
was in fact the right account, the profile photo provided for the
MapMy account was matched to their other accounts. Some of these
users’ other social media profiles were also public and included
photos of their children. For one user, we were able to find their
baby registry that included the husband’s name, who we were also
able to find information on based off their spouse’s public accounts.
We were also able to find their voting registry that included their
current and past addresses. From there we used the address listed
on their voter’s registry to show that the start and end of their path
was in fact where they lived.
This is concerning, especially when looking at the fact that “sta-
tistics show that 76 percent of female homicide victims are stalked
before they are murdered". As well as the fact that Betsy Carlson, a
professional dealing with domestic violence cases stated, “Social
media has become more of a tactic used by stalkers, and because
people can create a false identity or use GPS, on-line sources, and
email they don’t even have to present and these tools have embold-
ened stalkers". [35].
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Having an idea of the types of artifacts that can be found in fit-
ness applications will provide investigators a better lead. The same
concept can be applied to Web platforms, due to the fact that they
show all the information one can find on a user that is registered
with a Strava and MapMyFitness account, and possibly other fit-
ness websites. With the help of a tool such as the one referenced
in this paper, investigators can efficiently find specific pieces of
information they are looking for.
Future work should focus on health and fitness application anal-
ysis on iOS, which makes up 44.3% of mobile users [4]. Another
possible area for future work would be to focus on wearable de-
vices. These have grown in popularity with devices such as Apple
Watches and FitBits. In 2016, the number of connected wearable
devices was 325 million worldwide [3].
In addition, a Sitemaps management system for the Web Scraper
warrants future work. This could help examiners create Sitemaps
for different websites as needed enabling reuse of such maps. Lastly,
data fusion and visualization approaches for correlating data be-
tween health and fitness apps, and other devices would be of para-
mount importance, to expedite future investigations.
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7 APPENDIX
Table 5: MapMyRun Artifacts
File Name Information Found
io-uacf-client-events.db clientID, deviceID, duraton, requestID, timestamp, domain,
user agent, app version
workout.db workouts altitude, latitude, longitude, date, workoutID,
start time, end time, distance, calories, note, steps, weight,
heart rate, timestamp
com.amplitude.api userID, OS, OS version, device, language, gender, age, reg-
istration date, weight, height, birthday, city
mmdk_user.db userID, username, email, first name, last name, display
name, birthday, gender, height, weight, timezone, date









cSPrefs.xml last measurement timestamp, last sessiontimestamp,
amount of runs, active user session count, first install ID
currentUserId.xml current UserID
deviceLocationChecker.xml last time location was checked
deviceLocationManager.xml country, zip code, city
eventLogHarness_prefs.xml last work out ID
fcm_.xml FCM (firebased client messaging) clientID, registrationID,
enabled or not
mfpApiPrefs.xml API access token
session.xml appID, clientKeyInfo, clientID, creation timestamps, client-
TokenInfo, access token, server key info, user info map, do-
mainUserID, email, display name, full name, userID, user
creation date
notification-inbox.db notifications including userID, engagementID, time cre-
ated, deleted or not, state (unread, pending, etc.), expiration
date, notification info
log_2019-03-18_18/20/47.txt log of application events
Table 6: MapMyRide Artifacts
File Name Information Found
io-uacf-client-events.db clientID, deviceID, duraton, requestID, timestamp, domain,
user agent, app version
workout.db workouts altitude, latitude, longitude, date, workoutID,
start time, end time, distance, calories, note, steps, weight,
heart rate, timestamp
com.amplitude.api userID, OS, OS version, device, language, gender, age, reg-
istration date, weight, height, birthday, city
mmdk_user.db userID, username, email, first name, last name, display
name, birthday, gender, height, weight, timezone, date









cSPrefs.xml last measurement timestamp, last sessiontimestamp,
amount of runs, active user session count, first install ID
currentUserId.xml current UserID
deviceLocationChecker.xml last time location was checked
deviceLocationManager.xml country, zip code, city
eventLogHarness_prefs.xml last work out ID
fcm_.xml FCM (firebased client messaging) clientID, registrationID,
enabled or not
mfpApiPrefs.xml API access token
session.xml appID, clientKeyInfo, clientID, creation timestamps, client-
TokenInfo, access token, server key info, user info map, do-
mainUserID, email, display name, full name, userID, user
creation date
notification-inbox.db notifications including userID, engagementID, time cre-
ated, deleted or not, state (unread, pending, etc.), expiration
date, notification info
log_2019-03-18_18/20/47.txt log of application events
Table 7: MapMyWalk Artifacts
File Name Information Found
io-uacf-client-events.db clientID, deviceID, duraton, requestID, timestamp, domain,
user agent, app version
workout.db workouts altitude, latitude, longitude, date, workoutID,
start time, end time, distance, calories, note, steps, weight,
heart rate, timestamp
com.amplitude.api userID, OS, OS version, device, language, gender, age, reg-
istration date, weight, height, birthday, city
mmdk_user.db userID, username, email, first name, last name, display
name, birthday, gender, height, weight, timezone, date









cSPrefs.xml last measurement timestamp, last sessiontimestamp,
amount of runs, active user session count, first install ID
currentUserId.xml current UserID
deviceLocationChecker.xml last time location was checked
deviceLocationManager.xml country, zip code, city
eventLogHarness_prefs.xml last work out ID
fcm_.xml FCM (firebased client messaging) clientID, registrationID,
enabled or not
mfpApiPrefs.xml API access token
session.xml appID, clientKeyInfo, clientID, creation timestamps, client-
TokenInfo, access token, server key info, user info map, do-
mainUserID, email, display name, full name, userID, user
creation date
notification-inbox.db notifications including userID, engagementID, time cre-
ated, deleted or not, state (unread, pending, etc.), expiration
date, notification info
log_2019-03-18_18/20/47.txt log of application events
Table 8: MapMyHike Artifacts
File Name Information Found
io-uacf-client-events.db clientID, deviceID, duraton, requestID, timestamp, domain,
user agent, app version
workout.db workouts altitude, latitude, longitude, date, workoutID,
start time, end time, distance, calories, note, steps, weight,
heart rate, timestamp
com.amplitude.api userID, OS, OS version, device, language, gender, age, reg-
istration date, weight, height, birthday, city
mmdk_user.db userID, username, email, first name, last name, display
name, birthday, gender, height, weight, timezone, date









cSPrefs.xml last measurement timestamp, last sessiontimestamp,
amount of runs, active user session count, first install ID
currentUserId.xml current UserID
deviceLocationChecker.xml last time location was checked
deviceLocationManager.xml country, zip code, city
eventLogHarness_prefs.xml last work out ID
fcm_.xml FCM (firebased client messaging) clientID, registrationID,
enabled or not
mfpApiPrefs.xml API access token
session.xml appID, clientKeyInfo, clientID, creation timestamps, client-
TokenInfo, access token, server key info, user info map, do-
mainUserID, email, display name, full name, userID, user
creation date
notification-inbox.db notifications including userID, engagementID, time cre-
ated, deleted or not, state (unread, pending, etc.), expiration
date, notification info
log_2019-03-18_18/20/47.txt log of application events
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Table 9: RunKeeper Artifacts
File Name Information Found
EventLog.sqlite last activity location, system language, event name, page
accessed, and user ID
RunKepper.sqlite challenge id, description, name, rewards, social share com-
ponent, trigger ID, start date, end date
admob.xml last weight sync, userID, app language, birthday, whether
activity tracker is connected, logged out or not, creation
time, name, lifetime total distance, email, profile pic URL,













api key, userID, created time, registrationID, registration
version, customerID
Table 10: Runtastic Artifacts
File Name Information Found
DCIM/runtastic folder of photos uploaded to app with timestamps stored
on SD card
files/Pictures same photos as above, stored in different location with
timestamps
apptimize.db age, gender, app install date, device specifications, app key
db shoe information, connected devices, longitude, latitude, al-
titude, distance, speed, friends, photos uploaded (local loca-
tion, URL, timestamp), heart rate with timestamp, activity
session info (userID, serverSessionID, distance, start time,
end time, date, avg speed, max speed, note, pulse, longitude,
latitude, elevation, shoeID)
google_analytics_v4.db userID, appID, app version




first run, monitoring start timestamp
com.google.android.gms.
measurement.pref.xml




email, display name, google sign in account, tokenID, ID
com.newrelic.android.agent.
v1_com.runtastic.android.xml
deviceID, version code, data token, app version, app build,






first name, last name, avatar URL, height, weight, birthdate,
first app start timestamp, country, gender
Table 11: Fitness Tracker Artifacts
File Name Information Found
000003.log height, weight, waist measurement, hip measurement,
neck measurement, gender, ethnicity, blood type, pregnant
(yes or no), lactating (yes or no)
google_analytics_v4.db customerID, app version
com.google.android.gms.
analytics.prefs.xml
first run time, monitoring start timestamp
Table 12: JEFIT Artifacts
File Name Information Found
/jefit/PPictures/Thumbnails/ folder stores thumbnails of uploaded photos
/jefit/PPictures/Fullsize/ folder stores same photos as above, but full size
/sdcard/jefit/PPictures/
Fullsize/
same photos as above, but full size saved on sdcard
/sdcard/jefit/PPictures/
Thumbnails/
same photos as above, but thumbnails saved on sdcard
com.google.android.gms.
analytics.pref.xml
first run, monitoring start timestamp
com.google.android.gms.
measurement.pref.xml
first open time, time open, start time, pause time, upload
time
JEFITPreferences.xml first install timestamp, MD5 hash of password, username,
userID
data.db exerciseLogs(timestamp, date, type, log), photos (photoID,
time taken, edit time), profile(height, weight, log time, my
date, edit time), setting (gender, date of birth)
Table 13: Strava Artifacts
File Name Information Found
files/ uploaded photos in files directory
branch_referral_shared_pref.
xml
user profile URL, last update time, app version, identityID
com.google.android.gms.
analytics.pref.xml
first run, monitoring start timestamp
com.google.android.gms.
measurement.pref.xml




last activity type, last activity change timestamp
strava.db first name, last name, email, gender, birthdate,
com.strava_preferences.xml athleteID key, user access token
com.strava.preference.
userPreferences.xml
account type, google fit linked (true or false), gender, last
activity type
com.strava.xml installed timestamp, registration key, last update, userID,
projectID
apptimize.db app key, device model, app version code, app install date,




name, email, api key, userID
Table 14: MyFitnessPal Artifacts
File Name Information Found
myfitnesspal.db Exercise notes, food notes, images, measurements, user
info (email, username, weight), user properties (email, time-
zone, gender, date of birth, country, zip code, weight,
height, diary password), users (which users were logged
into the app)






app version, last logged in user, current user logged in, if
pin is required for app
session.xml email, userID, display name, gender, birthday, profile pic-
ture URL, height, weight, IDtoken
geo-location.xml last country code, last locale code
Table 15: Nike Training Artifacts
File Name Information Found




deviceId, data token, accountID, app version, device model,
version code








ns_common.db first name, last name, user name, birthdate, gender, email,
registration date, country, height, weight
ns_feed2.db userID, username, first name, last name, last updated times-
tamp, post information
ns_inbox.db inbox information(message, timestamp, notificationID,
identity hash
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Table 16: Health Infinity Artifacts
File Name Information Found
HealthAndFitness.db medicine pill tracker(last modified timestamp, start date
timestamp, number of days on medicine, comments), pro-
file details(display name), activity (activity details), user de-
tails (name, gender, birthday, height, weight)
com.droidinfinity.
healthplus_preferences.xml
height, weight, age, birthday, email, gender
google_analytics_v4.db customerID, appID, app version
analytics-android-ibhm3Jtwz
1rZ4EQemYsxTqglKo MlVSSC.xml
name, email, api key, userID
com.google.android.gms.
measurement.prefs.xml
time active, start time, pause time, last upload, previous os
version
Table 17: MapMyFitnessArtifacts
File Name Information Found
io-uacf-client-events.db clientID, deviceID, duraton, requestID, timestamp, domain,
user agent, app version
workout.db workouts altitude, latitude, longitude, date, workoutID,
start time, end time, distance, calories, note, steps, weight,
heart rate, timestamp
com.amplitude.api userID, OS, OS version, device, language, gender, age, reg-
istration date, weight, height, birthday, city
mmdk_user.db userID, username, email, first name, last name, display
name, birthday, gender, height, weight, timezone, date









cSPrefs.xml last measurement timestamp, last sessiontimestamp,
amount of runs, active user session count, first install ID
currentUserId.xml current UserID
deviceLocationChecker.xml last time location was checked
deviceLocationManager.xml country, zip code, city
eventLogHarness_prefs.xml last work out ID
fcm_.xml FCM (firebased client messaging) clientID, registrationID,
enabled or not
mfpApiPrefs.xml API access token
session.xml appID, clientKeyInfo, clientID, creation timestamps, client-
TokenInfo, access token, server key info, user info map, do-
mainUserID, email, display name, full name, userID, user
creation date
notification-inbox.db notifications including userID, engagementID, time cre-
ated, deleted or not, state (unread, pending, etc.), expiration
date, notification info
log_2019-03-18_18/20/47.txt log of application events
Figure 12: Sample output from python script
